A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model with Hidden Information: Sequential Optimality Through Truthful State Revelation
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Publication:3392201
DOI10.1287/OPRE.1070.0451zbMath1167.91383OpenAlexW2131723452MaRDI QIDQ3392201
Publication date: 13 August 2009
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f9516cd37c5405927ed8bfbcc3aa9af879c3f3bf
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40)
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