UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX
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Publication:3421638
DOI10.1142/S0219198906001028zbMath1197.91108OpenAlexW3123057264MaRDI QIDQ3421638
Publication date: 7 February 2007
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001028
Cites Work
- A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
- The Nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems
- An extension of the Nash bargaining solution to nonconvex problems
- Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda
- Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
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