Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection

DOI10.2307/1913244zbMath0618.90017OpenAlexW2042897887MaRDI QIDQ3755195

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Publication date: 1987

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913244

zbMATH Keywords

existenceuniquenessasymmetric informationscreeningsignallingself-selectioninformational equilibriuminformational consistencyreactive equilibrium concept

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (10)

A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games ⋮ A note on uniqueness in game-theoretic foundations of the reactive equilibrium ⋮ Upper semi-continuity of the separating equilibrium correspondence ⋮ The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games ⋮ Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance ⋮ An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection ⋮ A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION ⋮ Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection ⋮ (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem ⋮ Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection

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