A stochastic game with complete information and without equilibrium situations in pure stationary strategies

DOI10.1070/RM1988v043n02ABEH001717zbMath0677.90095MaRDI QIDQ3833898

Vladimir A. Gurvich

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Russian Mathematical Surveys (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

positional gamesfinite directed graphergodic extension3\(\times 3\) bimatrix gameNash equilibria in pure stationary strategiestwo-person stochastic game with perfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (6)

On Nash equilibria and improvement cycles in pure positional strategies for chess-like and backgammon-like \(n\)-person games ⋮ Nash-solvable two-person symmetric cycle game forms ⋮ On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of the deterministic \(n\)-person games with perfect information and mean or total effective cost ⋮ Chess-like games may have no uniform Nash equilibria even in mixed strategies ⋮ A nested family of \(k\)-total effective rewards for positional games ⋮ On non-existence of pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium

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