Competitive Bidding with Dependent Value Estimates

DOI10.1287/opre.28.3.603zbMath0442.90048OpenAlexW1992385524MaRDI QIDQ3885505

Daniel G. Brooks, Robert L. Winkler

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.28.3.603

zbMATH Keywords

optimal bidding strategiescompetitive biddingauctioningdependent value estimatesuncertain value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90B99)

Related Items (5)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in \((k+1)\)-st price common value auctions ⋮ Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud ⋮ Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders

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