Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00090zbMath0962.91016OpenAlexW2034725308MaRDI QIDQ4262876

Barton L. Lipman

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00090

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitylogical omniscience

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02)

Related Items (15)

Understanding the nonadditive probability decision model ⋮ Expected utility without parsimony ⋮ Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs ⋮ On the rejectability of the subjective expected utility theory ⋮ Subjective expected utility with imperfect perception ⋮ Dynamic consistency for non-expected utility preferences ⋮ Constructive decision theory ⋮ Unawareness with ``possible possible worlds ⋮ QUANTIFIED LOGIC OF AWARENESS AND IMPOSSIBLE POSSIBLE WORLDS ⋮ Dealing with logical omniscience: expressiveness and pragmatics ⋮ Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study ⋮ Fragmentation and logical omniscience ⋮ Impossible worlds and partial belief ⋮ Framing effects as violations of extensionality ⋮ Subjective contingencies and limited Bayesian updating

This page was built for publication: Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality