Publication:4495209
From MaRDI portal
zbMath0959.91014MaRDI QIDQ4495209
E. Kurbanov, Fuad T. Aleskerov
Publication date: 10 August 2000
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation, Statistical evaluation of voting rules, On the safety of group manipulation, Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents, The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models, Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings, On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives, Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules, One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness, On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition, Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability, Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions, Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains, Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable, Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information, On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules, Manipulability in school choice, Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules, Strategic voting and nomination, Dominating, weakly stable, and uncovered sets: properties and generalizations, Weighted committee games, Dictatorship versus manipulability, Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity, Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules, Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?, Gains from manipulating social choice rules, Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule, Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules, Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules, On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules, Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities, Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
