Stability of strategies in payoff-driven evolutionary games on networks
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Publication:5264324
DOI10.1063/1.3613924zbMath1317.91004arXiv1106.6058OpenAlexW3104192825WikidataQ50606759 ScholiaQ50606759MaRDI QIDQ5264324
Nicholas A. Mecholsky, Francesco Sorrentino
Publication date: 27 July 2015
Published in: Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.6058
Stability of solutions to ordinary differential equations (34D20) Qualitative investigation and simulation of ordinary differential equation models (34C60) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Cites Work
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