Strategic Characterization of the Index of an Equilibrium

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_22zbMath1136.91344OpenAlexW190441398MaRDI QIDQ5459988

Arndt von Schemde, Bernhard von Stengel

Publication date: 2 May 2008

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_22

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (3)

Enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games ⋮ On sustainable equilibria ⋮ Quantifying transversality by measuring the robustness of intersections

Cites Work

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• On the indices of zeros of Nash fields
• Index and stability in bimatrix games. A geometric-combinatorial approach.
• Lectures on Polytopes
• Matrix Classes That Generate All Matrices with Positive Determinant
• Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
• Nash equilibria in random games

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