A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation (Q1089233)

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A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
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    A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation (English)
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    1987
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    This paper gives a simple proof of the following result, which is due to \textit{E. Maskin} [''Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality'', to appear]: If an n-person social choice rule f, with \(n\geq 3\), satisfies monotonicity and no veto power, then f can be implemented in Nash equilibria.
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    n-person social choice rule
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    monotonicity
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    no veto power
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    Nash equilibria
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