What is structural empiricism? Scientific change in an empiricist setting (Q1583737)

This paper contributes to the realism-empiricism debate in the philosophy of science. It especially provides an empiricist answer to H. Putnam's `no miracles' argument, i.e., Putnam's claim that ``the positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle'' [\textit{H. Putnam}, Mathematics, matter and method. Philosophical papers, vol. I, 2nd ed., Cambridge UP, Cambridge (1979; Zbl 0426.00022), p. 60]. The author's proposal is based on B. van Fraassen's constructive empiricist research programme, enriched with N. C. A. da Costa's and S. French's concepts of partial structures and quasi-truth. The author writes about his strategy to master the no-miracles argument: ``The first step consists in formulating a convenient notion of empirical adequacy, that allows, in particular, the introduction of degrees of empirical adequacy. Based on this, I shall then propose a model of scientific change, compatible with the main theses of constructive empiricism, and with this model at least part of the realist challenge can be met'' (pp. 64-65). He calls his approach `structural empiricism', ``being, on the one hand, disentangled from certain metaphysical assumptions typically found in realism [\dots], and sticking, on the other hand, to the employment of particular structures (in perfect agreement to the constructive empiricist stance)'' (p. 79).