Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation (Q1973452)
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| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation |
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Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation (English)
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2 May 2001
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The problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods (e.g. jobs) as well as a fixed amount of a divisible good (e.g. money) among a set of agents is considered. Strategy-proof mechanisms are studied. For the 2-agent, 2-good case a robust characterization is provided. For the multi-good case many rules exist and further requirements are added. By requiring coalitional strategy-proofness and nonbossiness, the rules turn out to be not more complex than the Shapley-Scarf housing model. A conflict between strategy-proofness and efficiency is highlighted.
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strategy-proof mechanisms
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indivisible goods
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efficiency
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