On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings (Q1583164)

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On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
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    On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings (English)
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    26 October 2000
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    A sufficient condition for uniqueness is identified on the preferences in the marriage problem, i.e. two-sided one-to-one matching with non transferable utility. For small economies this condition is also necessary. This class of preferences is broad and they are of particular relevance in economic applications.
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    marriage problem
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    matching
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    uniqueness
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