Welfare-improving misreported polls

DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01413-9zbMath1520.91139OpenAlexW4211009677MaRDI QIDQ6107367

Felipe R. Durazzo, David Turchick

Publication date: 3 July 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01413-9

zbMATH Keywords

costly votingmisreportingpre-election pollsbandwagon effectpivotal voting model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
• Public information and electoral bias
• Welfare reducing polls
• Pointwise versions of the maximum theorem with applications in optimization
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Axiomatic characterization of the quadratic scoring rule
• Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations
• Convergence within binary market scoring rules
• The Binarized Scoring Rule
• Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
• The Frequency Distribution of the Difference Between Two Poisson Variates Belonging to Different Populations

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