A predator-prey economic system of tax evasion and corrupt behavior

DOI10.3934/jdg.2022025zbMath1519.91110OpenAlexW4312558799MaRDI QIDQ6107328

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Publication date: 3 July 2023

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2022025

zbMATH Keywords

income inequalitybribes and corruptionimitation and evolutionary dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Institutions and growth in limited access societies
• Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
• On the cultural transmission of corruption
• Corruption driven by imitative behavior
• Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
• On the generalized pantograph functional-differential equation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms
• Differential and functional equations of inverse problems for nonlinear equations
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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