Pages that link to "Item:Q1867531"

The following pages link to Strong belief and forward induction reasoning. (Q1867531):

Displaying 50 items.

• Admissibility and assumption (Q281332) (← links)
• Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information (Q338910) (← links)
• Forward induction equilibrium (Q417699) (← links)
• Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players (Q423741) (← links)
• Editorial: Weighted logics for artificial intelligence -- an introductory discussion (Q465578) (← links)
• Conditional belief types (Q485774) (← links)
• Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction (Q491310) (← links)
• Full implementation in backward induction (Q492868) (← links)
• The context of the game (Q513591) (← links)
• A minimal logic for interactive epistemology (Q516245) (← links)
• Epistemic logic meets epistemic game theory: a comparison between multi-agent Kripke models and type spaces (Q516317) (← links)
• Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games (Q523503) (← links)
• A rational way of playing: revision theory for strategic interaction (Q722022) (← links)
• When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? (Q725041) (← links)
• When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs? (Q844914) (← links)
• Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability (Q844918) (← links)
• Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure (Q844943) (← links)
• The equivalence of Bayes and causal rationality in games (Q850481) (← links)
• Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games (Q857564) (← links)
• An impossibility theorem on beliefs in games (Q863184) (← links)
• The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology (Q878162) (← links)
• Robust dynamic implementation (Q893413) (← links)
• The logic of backward induction (Q900436) (← links)
• Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction (Q931782) (← links)
• Self-admissible sets (Q969128) (← links)
• Dynamic psychological games (Q1001812) (← links)
• Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox (Q1036069) (← links)
• Common theories (Q1038264) (← links)
• Admissibility and common belief. (Q1395583) (← links)
• Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem (Q1651228) (← links)
• Rationalizability and logical inference (Q1651238) (← links)
• Opportunistic conformism (Q1729669) (← links)
• Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings (Q1735799) (← links)
• King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot (Q1756333) (← links)
• Bayesian updating rules and AGM belief revision (Q1757554) (← links)
• Perfect forward induction (Q1787717) (← links)
• On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games (Q1792576) (← links)
• On the epistemic foundation for backward induction (Q1867838) (← links)
• Dynamic interactive epistemology (Q1886744) (← links)
• Limited focus in dynamic games (Q2002069) (← links)
• Reasoning about rationality (Q2013339) (← links)
• Modeling reasoning in a social setting (Q2016076) (← links)
• Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies (Q2016225) (← links)
• Common belief in future and restricted past rationality (Q2021823) (← links)
• Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games (Q2044997) (← links)
• Iterated dominance revisited (Q2059064) (← links)
• Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness (Q2067366) (← links)
• Updating confidence in beliefs (Q2067404) (← links)
• Informational robustness of common belief in rationality (Q2078102) (← links)
• Simple unawareness in dynamic psychological games (Q2098870) (← links)