A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness
- Almost envy-freeness with general valuations
- Approximating the Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations
- Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
- Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods to Asymmetric Agents
- Fair enough: guaranteeing approximate maximin shares
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7651150 (Why is no real title available?)
- Multiple birds with one stone: beating 1/2 for EFX and GMMS via envy cycle elimination
- Nash social welfare for indivisible items under separable, piecewise-linear concave utilities
- Nash social welfare, matrix permanent, and stable polynomials
- On fair division for indivisible items
Cited in
(28)- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies
- On the existence of EFX allocations
- A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness
- EFX under budget constraint
- Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions
- Approximating Nash social welfare by matching and local search
- EFX allocations exist for binary valuations
- The frontier of intractability for EFX with two agents
- One quarter each (on average) ensures proportionality
- Fair division with prioritized agents
- The price of fairness for budget-feasible EF1 allocations
- The frontier of intractability for EFX with two agents
- Parameterized complexity of incomplete connected fair division
- Restricted existence and approximation algorithms for PMMS
- Algorithms for 2-balanced connected k-partition problem in graphs
- Algorithms for 2-balanced connected \(k\)-partition problem in graphs
- On the existence of EFX (and Pareto-optimal) allocations for binary chores
- Finding fair and efficient allocations under budget constraints
- On the existence of EFX (and Pareto-optimal) allocations for binary chores
- Guaranteeing fairness and efficiency under budget constraints
- Fair division with subjective divisibility
- Proportional allocation of indivisible goods up to the least valued good on average
- Fair division of chores with budget constraints
- Nearly tight bounds on the price of fairness for indivisible items under budget constraints
- Almost envy-free allocation of indivisible goods: a tale of two valuations
- Best-of-both-worlds fair allocation of indivisible and mixed goods
- Approximating EFX through a new notion of fairness
- Approximating Nash social welfare by matching and local search
This page was built for publication: A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4957912)