A multiunit generalization of a first price auction

DOI10.1016/S0898-1221(03)90133-7MaRDI QIDQ597311zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yong-Hong Long

Publication date 6 August 2004

Published in Computers & Mathematics with Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

AuctionConstant relative risk averseEquilibrium bid function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions

Cited in

(7)

• Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach
• A comparison of first price multi-object auctions
• The case for multi-unit single-run descending-price auctions
• Multiple unit auctions with strategic price-quantity decisions
• A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions
• Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions
• Multi-unit Auctions with Budgets and Non-uniform Valuations

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