A paradigm-based solution to the riddle of induction

DOI10.1023/A:1005029624940MaRDI QIDQ1307873zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mark A. Changizi, Timothy P. Barber

Publication date 22 October 2000

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005029624940

zbMATH Keywords

inductionparadigm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)

Review text

The thesis of the authors is that ``\dots{} conceptual frameworks can replace Personalistic Bayesianism's subjective degrees of belief as the primitive objects in a theory of induction. The thesis is based on three definitions, three principles, and a number of theorems, all of which are presented informally. Two of the principles concern uniform distributions of probability. Many important words and phrases are not defined, so that it is hard to see why the theorems are called `theorems'.

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Cited in

(1)

• A Priori Advantages of Meta-Induction and the No Free Lunch Theorem: A Contradiction?

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