A protocol for repeated bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2023.111132MaRDI QIDQ6093649zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Akihisa Kato, José-Víctor Ríos-Rull

Publication date 12 September 2023

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111132

zbMATH Keywords

limited commitmentMarkov perfect equilibriarepeated bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining
• Gambling reputation: repeated bargaining with outside options
• A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown
• On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols
• Bargaining and Reputation

Cites work

• Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and a Test of Commitment
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets
• Recursive contracts
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• The method of endogenous gridpoints for solving dynamic stochastic optimization problems

Cited in

(2)

• Bargaining conventions
• Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation

This page was built for publication: A protocol for repeated bargaining

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6093649)