An Improved Robust Fuzzy Extractor
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Abstract: We consider the problem of building robust fuzzy extractors, which allow two parties holding similar random variables W, W' to agree on a secret key R in the presence of an active adversary. Robust fuzzy extractors were defined by Dodis et al. in Crypto 2006 to be noninteractive, i.e., only one message P, which can be modified by an unbounded adversary, can pass from one party to the other. This allows them to be used by a single party at different points in time (e.g., for key recovery or biometric authentication), but also presents an additional challenge: what if R is used, and thus possibly observed by the adversary, before the adversary has a chance to modify P. Fuzzy extractors secure against such a strong attack are called post-application robust. We construct a fuzzy extractor with post-application robustness that extracts a shared secret key of up to (2m-n)/2 bits (depending on error-tolerance and security parameters), where n is the bit-length and m is the entropy of W. The previously best known result, also of Dodis et al., extracted up to (2m-n)/3 bits (depending on the same parameters).
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Cited in
(19)- LWE without modular reduction and improved side-channel attacks against BLISS
- Robustly reusable fuzzy extractor from standard assumptions
- A reusable fuzzy extractor with practical storage size: modifying Canetti et al.'s construction
- Computational robust (fuzzy) extractors for CRS-dependent sources with minimal min-entropy
- A practical fuzzy extractor for continuous features
- When Are Fuzzy Extractors Possible?
- Improved extraction method on logic function optimization of mass data processing
- On related-secret pseudorandomness
- Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
- Key Agreement from Close Secrets over Unsecured Channels
- A robust fuzzy extractor without ECCs
- Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2004
- Detection of Algebraic Manipulation with Applications to Robust Secret Sharing and Fuzzy Extractors
- Robust Fuzzy Extractors and Authenticated Key Agreement from Close Secrets
- Nonmalleable digital lockers and robust fuzzy extractors in the plain model
- Non-malleable fuzzy extractors
- Robustly reusable fuzzy extractor from isogeny
- Computational robust (fuzzy) extractors for CRS-dependent sources with minimal min-entropy
- Robustly reusable fuzzy extractor with imperfect randomness
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