An analysis of dual-issue final-offer arbitration

DOI10.1007/S00182-018-0653-7MaRDI QIDQ2424236zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Brian R. Powers

Publication date 24 June 2019

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.02864

zbMATH Keywords

Brams-Merrillfinal-offer arbitrationmulti-issuenoncooperative game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Abstract: We discuss final-offer arbitration where two quantitative issues are in dispute and model it as a zero-sum game. Under reasonable assumptions we both derive a pure strategy pair and show that it is both a local equilibrium and furthermore that it is the unique global equilibrium.

Recommendations

• Dual-issue final-offer arbitration: invariance of pure optimal strategies under \(L_p\) metrics
• Final-Offer Arbitration
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5141255
• Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
• Arbitration procedures with multiple arbitrators

Cites work

• Arbitration procedures with multiple arbitrators
• Arbitration using the closest offer principle of arbitrator behavior.
• Efficiency Analysis for Multivariate Distributions
• Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
• Final-Offer Arbitration
• Final-offer arbitration and risk aversion in bargaining
• Final-Offer Arbitration Under Incomplete Information
• Final-offer arbitration with uncertainty averse parties
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3358265 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3023295 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(6)

• Double-offer arbitration
• Convergence analysis for symmetric arbitration games FOA and DOA
• Final-Offer Arbitration
• Final-Offer Arbitration Under Incomplete Information
• The analysis of Nash equilibrium on final-offer arbitration model
• Dual-issue final-offer arbitration: invariance of pure optimal strategies under \(L_p\) metrics

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