Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best

DOI10.1287/MNSC.32.10.1346MaRDI QIDQ3738967zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven J. Brams, Samuel III Merrill

Publication date 1986

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.32.10.1346

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingbinding arbitrationfinal-offer arbitrationsettling disputestwo-person, zero-sum game of imperfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Equilibrium in combined arbitration procedure
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• An amendment to final-offer arbitration.
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Cited in

(20)

• Double-offer arbitration
• An amendment to final-offer arbitration.
• Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games
• Arbitration using the closest offer principle of arbitrator behavior.
• Effects of multiple arbitrators on final-offer arbitration settlements
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• An analysis of dual-issue final-offer arbitration
• Equilibrium in combined arbitration procedure
• Arbitrating a Dispute: A Decision Analytic Approach
• Final-Offer Arbitration
• Final-Offer Arbitration Under Incomplete Information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1159415 (Why is no real title available?)
• Arbitration procedures with multiple arbitrators
• Optimal arbitration
• Balancing the power to appoint officers
• Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration
• Cryptographic protocols for auctions and bargaining
• Final-offer arbitration with reference-dependent preferences
• Bargaining outcomes with double-offer arbitration
• On the rule of \(k\) names

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