Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration
The authors consider the basic version of the standard alternating offers bargaining model [\textit{A. Rubinstein}, Econometrica 50, 97-109 (1982; Zbl 0474.90092)] in which two parties negotiate over the division of a surplus normalized to unity. This model is modified to allow the two to agree at any point to call in an arbitrator, whose decision is commonly known and binding. The interesting result is that no matter what the arbitration outcome is, and even though each party has veto power over bringing in the arbitrator, as long as arbitration costs are sufficiently small, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the modified standard noncooperative bargaining model which coincides, subject to the arbitration cost, with the arbitrated outcome. The results are compared with outside option models.
- A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
- Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
- Double-offer arbitration
- Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
- Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
- On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties
- Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
- Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options
- Strategic bargaining with destructive power.
- Reinterpreting arbitration's narcotic effect: An experimental study of learning in repeated bargaining
- Outside options in a bargaining model with decay in the size of the cake
- Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining
- The effect of disagreement on noncooperative bargaining.
- The gambling effect of final-offer arbitration in bargaining
- Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator
- Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration
- Stakeholder bargaining games
- How best to disagree in order to agree?
- Stable compromises under corrupt arbitration
- Union leaders as experts: wage bargaining and strikes with union-wide ballot requirements
- On the equilibrium in bargaining model with arbitrator
- Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2202832 (Why is no real title available?)
- Holdup and innovation
- Arbitration systems and negotiations
- Finite alternating-move arbitration schemes and the equal area solution
- Bargaining with split-the-difference arbitration
- Lexicographic arbitration
This page was built for publication: Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5953420)
