Basic entrenchment
A long-standing puzzle about the use of epistemic entrenchment in the semantics of AGM belief change is that while it gives an elegant characterization of the `extended postulates' for contraction and revision, it has resisted attempts to adapt it to characterize what AGM called the `basic postulates'. In this respect, it is quite unlike the partial meet semantics or safe contraction, both of which admit such modularity in a natural way. The paper under review finally solves this problem, and with elegance. At the same time, the author's approach also yields entrenchment-style characterizations of various interesting subsets of the basic postulates.
- Back to basics: belief revision through direct selection
- Logical dynamics of belief change in the community
- Two concepts of plausibility in default reasoning
- Belief contraction in the context of the general theory of rational choice
- Bounded revision: two-dimensional belief change between conservative and moderate revision
- Economics and economy in the theory of belief revision (preliminary report)
- Believability relations for select-direct sentential revision
- AGM 25 years. Twenty-five years of research in belief change
- A new psychologism in logic? Reflections from the point of view of belief revision
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