Bayesian calibrated click-through auctions

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.ICALP.2024.44MaRDI QIDQ6875160zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Junjie Chen, Minming Li, Haifeng Xu, Song Zuo

Publication date 14 January 2026

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.ICALP.2024.44

zbMATH Keywords

ad auctionsinformation designmechanism designonline advertising

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of software (68Nxx) Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites work

• Ad auctions with data
• Algorithmic aspects of private Bayesian persuasion
• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7788377 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mixture selection, mechanism design, and signaling
• Multi-channel Bayesian persuasion
• On the hardness of signaling
• On the Tractability of Public Persuasion with No Externalities
• Optimal Auction Design
• Private Bayesian persuasion
• Selling Information Through Consulting
• Targeting and signaling in ad auctions

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