Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2023.05.003MaRDI QIDQ6106556zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Shimai Su, Elena M. Parilina

Publication date 3 July 2023

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ORL.2023.05.003

zbMATH Keywords

coalition structuredifferential gamepartial cooperationpollution controlstabilitytransfer payment scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

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Cites work

• A cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution
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• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Governance mechanism for global greenhouse gas emissions: a stochastic differential game approach
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3617947 (Why is no real title available?)
• Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games
• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
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• New trends in dynamic games and applications
• Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
• Stable coalition structures in dynamic competitive environment
• The bargaining problem
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• The Shapley value as a sustainable cooperative solution in differential games of three players
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Theory and applications of dynamic games. A course on noncooperative and cooperative games played over event trees
• Time Consistency in Cooperative Differential Games: A Tutorial

Cited in

(2)

• Designing stable coalition structures for international environmental agreements
• A note on cooperative differential games with pairwise interactions

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