Candidate behavior under mixed motives

DOI10.1007/BF00450996MaRDI QIDQ1820653zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Douglas W. Mitchell

Publication date 1987

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00450996

zbMATH Keywords

spatial election

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

This paper presents a spatial election model in which candidates have mixed motives: They care both about winning and about the content of their platforms. The predictions of the model are broadly consistent with what we observe empirically: some elections with convergent candidate positions, and some with divergent positions; the prevalence of elections in which the expected vote shares are not equal; candidates' positions reacting in part to those of their opponents; and candidates seeking a balance between what they believe and what they need to advocate to get elected.

Recommendations

• The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates
• Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
• Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
• Vote-motivated candidates
• Political Motivations

Cites work

• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
• Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
• Expected Plurality Voting Equilibrium and Social Choice Functions
• Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium

Cited in

(5)

• Modelling the role of information in elections
• Candidate ability and platform choice
• Vote-motivated candidates
• The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates
• Political Motivations

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