Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0564-7MaRDI QIDQ818529zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

Publication date 21 March 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269480/files/twerp667.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Candidate stabilityProbabilistic voting proceduresRandom dictatorship.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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(8)

• Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice
• Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
• The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures
• Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
• Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
• New results on equilibria in strategic candidacy
• Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models
• Candidate stability and voting correspondences

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