Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Cheating to Get Better Roommates in a Random Stable Matching
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1342147
- Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm
- Cheating strategies for the Gale-Shapley algorithm with complete preference lists
- Gale-Shapley stable marriage problem revisited: strategic issues and applications
Cited in
(11)- Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
- Improving man-optimal stable matchings by minimum change of preference lists
- Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm
- Cheating strategies for the Gale-Shapley algorithm with complete preference lists
- Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
- Descending the stable matching lattice: how many strategic agents are required to turn pessimality to optimality?
- On classical and modern marriage problems
- Gale-Shapley stable marriage problem revisited: strategic issues and applications
- Cheating to Get Better Roommates in a Random Stable Matching
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1342147 (Why is no real title available?)
- Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams
This page was built for publication: Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5449547)