Communication frictions and equilibrium pragmatics

DOI10.1007/S00182-025-00936-4MaRDI QIDQ6992116zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Toru Suzuki

Publication date 28 April 2025

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-025-00936-4

zbMATH Keywords

communication costsequilibrium pragmaticsGricean implicaturenaive receiverrelevance theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites work

• Efficient communication and indexicality
• Endogenous ambiguity and rational miscommunication
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Language and the theory of the firm
• Language barriers
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Predicting pragmatic reasoning in language games
• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals

Cited in

(1)

• Meaning in communication games

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