Competitive Bidding with Dependent Value Estimates

DOI10.1287/OPRE.28.3.603MaRDI QIDQ3885505zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert L. Winkler, Daniel G. Brooks

Publication date 1980

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.28.3.603

zbMATH Keywords

auctioningcompetitive biddingdependent value estimatesoptimal bidding strategiesuncertain value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90B99)

Cited in

(5)

• Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
• Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud
• On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in (k+1)-st price common value auctions

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