Complicated equilibria for game problems
In classical game theory [\textit{J. Nash}, Ann. Math. (2) 54, 286--295 (1951; Zbl 0045.08202)], it is not guaranteed the uniqueness and even the existence of solutions of game problems. In the so-called theory of conflict equilibria (cf. [\textit{E. R. Smol'yakov}, Differ. Equ. 44, No. 11, 1628--1637 (2008); translation from Differ. Uravn. 44, No. 11, 1566--1575 (2008; Zbl 1181.91132)], among others) a system of notions of conflict equilibria is suggested that provide always a solution for arbitrary conflict problems. The problem of uniqueness remains unsolved yet. In this paper new notions of strong equilibrium are suggested. One of them is a generalization of the \(\overline{D}'\)-equilibrium in [Smol'yakov, loc. cit. (2008)] and the other is a modification of the classical Nash equilibrium. They are illustrated by static and dynamic games with two and three players. They present the new concepts of equilibria and already-known equilibria, clarifying the role of the new with inclusion relations. The main result of the paper can be treated as a generalization of one result in [\textit{E. R. Smol'yakov}, Theory of conflict equilibria (2005)] in the framework of the extension of the set of notions of conflict equilibria. First, they use a stochastic game with two participants in which it is quite difficult to find the strongest equilibrium and a solution without using the new notion of equilibrium, \(D^A-\)equilibrium, presented in this paper. The second example considered is a game with three participants each of which has only two strategies. The paper finishes finding strong equilibria in differential game problems. To do this, dynamical systems described by differential equations (cf. [\textit{E. R. Smol'yakov}, Differ. Equ. 43, No. 12, 1679--1690 (2007); translation from Differ. Uravn. 43, No. 12, 1637--1648 (2007; Zbl 1151.91027)], among others) are considered. An equilibrium is defined such that it is possible to obtain necessary existence conditions [Smol'yakov, loc. cit. (2005)] that can be used to obtain the solution of particular differential games. A two-person zero-sum differential game illustrates this case.
- Strong equilibrium for conflict problems
- Yet another step toward the uniqueness of solutions of game problems
- New notions of conflict equilibria and differential games
- Yet another step toward the uniqueness of solutions of game problems
- An approach to solution uniqueness in game problems
- Combined equilibrium for differential games
- The most common concept of equilibrium for conflict problems with side interests
- Useful new equilibria for differential games with side interests of the participants
- The most preferred equilibrium in noncooperative differential games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 221114
- Strong equilibrium for conflict problems
- Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems
- A system of equilibria for many-player games
- Useful equilibria for game theory
- New notions of conflict equilibria and differential games
- A circular arrangement of equilibria and a procedure for finding the strongest of them
- Combined equilibrium for differential games
- Combined equilibria for conflict problems
- Yet another strong equilibrium for game problems
- Coordinated equilibria in dynamic problems
- Search for the strongest equilibrium in multiperson games
- A complicated notion of equilibrium for conflict problems
- Relatively complicated equilibria in conflict problems
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