Coordinated equilibria in dynamic problems

MaRDI QIDQ701923zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors È. R. Smol'yakov

Publication date 17 January 2005

Published in Doklady Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

conflicting equilibriumtwo player games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Utility theory for games (91A30) Utility theory (91B16)

Review text

The idea is to replace the weakest known equilibrium in dynamic problems (\(A\)-equilibrium) by a little stronger, so-called \(A^c\) (consistent) equilibrium. The definition of an \(A^c\) consistent extreme strategy is presented. The theorem is proclaimed and it is proved that one can construct the sequence of the strongest equilibria at any arbitrary accuracy on the ground of a basic system of \(A^c\) equilibria.

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Cited in

(2)

• Existence of coordinating prices in dynamic systems
• Coordinated equilibria and a technique for solving differential games

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