Convergence of iterative scoring rules

DOI10.1613/JAIR.5187MaRDI QIDQ2953938zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Omer Lev, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Publication date 11 January 2017

Published in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.5187

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Iterative voting and acyclic games
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Cited in

(11)

• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• Learning agents for iterative voting
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting
• Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet efficiency and Borda score
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: convergence and Condorcet efficiency
• Best reply dynamics for scoring rules
• HITS Can Converge Slowly, but Not Too Slowly, in Score and Rank
• Iterative voting with partial preferences
• Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

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