Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: convergence and Condorcet efficiency

MaRDI QIDQ3388740zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Umberto Grandi, Andrea Loreggia, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable, Toby Walsh

Publication date 6 May 2021

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1303.0787, http://eptcs.web.cse.unsw.edu.au/paper.cgi?SR.6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet efficiency and Borda score
• Convergence of iterative scoring rules
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
• Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting

Cited in

(5)

• Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet efficiency and Borda score
• Convergence of iterative scoring rules
• Iterative voting with partial preferences
• Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs

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