Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0470-ZMaRDI QIDQ1780169zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Walter Trockel

Publication date 7 June 2005

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315394

zbMATH Keywords

Core convergenceEquivalence theoremNash-solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cited in

(7)

• Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs
• A new two-party bargaining mechanism
• The equilibrium of the bargaining game and core convergence theorem on an exchange economy with limited traders
• Optimal deterrence of cooperation
• Multicoalitional solutions
• Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
• Core-Equivalence for the Nash Bargaining Solution

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