Cyber-attack forecast modeling and complexity reduction using a game-theoretic framework
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Cites work
- ``Eventually revealing repeated games with incomplete information
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Balanced Truncation for a Class of Stochastic Jump Linear Systems and Model Reduction for Hidden Markov Models
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099352 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302008 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the relation between finitely and infinitely repeated games with incomplete information
- Optimal strategies for the uninformed player
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information
- The LP formulation of finite zero-sum games with incomplete information
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