Empirical distribution of equilibrium play and its testing application
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Abstract: We show that in any -player -action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse correlated. For each one of them we obtain upper and lower bounds on the number of samples required for the empirical distribution over the sampled action profiles to form an approximate equilibrium with probability close to one. These bounds imply that using a small number of samples we can test whether or not players are playing according to an approximate equilibrium, even in games where and are large. In addition, our results substantially improve previously known upper bounds on the support size of approximate equilibria in games with many players. In particular, for all the three types of equilibria we show the existence of approximate equilibrium with support size polylogarithmic in and , whereas the previously best-known upper bounds were polynomial in .
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Cited in
(10)- Learning convex partitions and computing game-theoretic equilibria from best response queries
- Multilinear games
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