Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring

DOI10.1239/JAP/1214950355MaRDI QIDQ3516412zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hsiao-Chi Chen, Yunshyong Chow

Publication date 5 August 2008

Published in Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1239/jap/1214950355

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gameimperfect monitoringrisk-dominant equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Evolution with changing mutation rates
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Expectations, drift, and volatility in evolutionary games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 765034 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
• On the convergence of evolution processes with time-varying mutations and local interaction
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The statistical mechanics of best-response strategy revision
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction

Cited in

(3)

• \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
• Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring
• Stochastically perturbed payoff observations in an evolutionary game

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