Essentialist blindness would not preclude counterfactual knowledge

DOI10.4000/PHILOSOPHIASCIENTIAE.745MaRDI QIDQ2910196zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sònia Roca-Royes

Publication date 7 September 2012

Published in Philosophia Scientiae (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.745

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

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