Modal knowledge and counterfactual knowledge

MaRDI QIDQ2904039zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sònia Roca-Royes

Publication date 5 August 2012

Published in Logique et Analyse. Nouvelle Série (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

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Cited in

(15)

• Epistemic semantics for counterfactuals
• Conceivability, counterfactual thinking and philosophical exceptionality of modal knowledge
• The epistemological objection to modal primitivism
• The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction
• Essence and modal knowledge
• On modal knowledge
• Essentialist blindness would not preclude counterfactual knowledge
• Counterfactuals and modus tollens in abductive arguments
• Structural models for Williamson's modal epistemology
• Conceivability and de re modal knowledge
• Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge
• Modal inferences in science: a tale of two epistemologies
• The epistemic significance of modal factors
• Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge
• Counterfactual epistemic scenarios

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