False-name-proof multi-unit auction protocol utilizing greedy allocation based on approximate evaluation values

DOI10.1007/3-540-45680-5_4MaRDI QIDQ4708087zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kenji Terada, Makoto Yokoo

Publication date 12 June 2003

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/2413/24130048.htm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68T99) Computing methodologies and applications (68U99)

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