Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids

DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00077-7MaRDI QIDQ5941555zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Makoto Yokoo, Y. Sakurai, S. Matsubara

Publication date 20 August 2001

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(01)00077-7

zbMATH Keywords

auctionelectronic commercegame theorymechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General topics in artificial intelligence (68T01) Computing methodologies and applications (68U99)

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Cites work

• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Microeconomic theory
• Optimal auctions revisited

Cited in

(15)

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• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions
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• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1927236 (Why is no real title available?)
• Agent-based product-support logistics system using XML and RDF
• False-name-proof combinatorial auction design via single-minded decomposition
• Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
• Trends of internet auctions and agent-mediated web commerce
• Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis
• Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions

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