Feedback-driven coevolution in finite structured populations
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Cites work
- An intermediate number of neighbors promotes the emergence of generous tit-for-tat players on homogeneous networks
- Cost efficiency of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations
- Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas
- Eco-evolutionary dynamics with payoff-dependent environmental feedback
- Effects of feedback regulation on vegetation patterns in semi-arid environments
- Evolution of trust in structured populations
- Evolutionary dynamics in state-feedback public goods games with peer punishment
- Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Exponential synchronization of neural networks via feedback control in complex environment
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- Imitation and aspiration dynamics bring different evolutionary outcomes in feedback-evolving games
- The replicator equation on graphs
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
- When selection pays: structured public goods game with a generalized interaction mode
- Winner-weaken-loser-strengthen rule leads to optimally cooperative interdependent networks
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