Frege on truth and reference
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This paper considers Frege's views on the reference of a sentence, in particular his identification in some cirumstances of the reference with the truth-value of the sentence. The author first considers the case of a sentence having a reference at all, then briefly considers Church's argument in support of Frege, in the process rejecting his assumption that ``logically equivalent sentences are coreferential. According to this author one can claim only that ``the logical structure of referents is isomorphic with the logical structure of the sentences.
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