Games of incomplete information: The inconsistent case
In his well known series \textit{J. C. Harsanyi} [1967-68] develops the theory of noncooperative games of incomplete information, in which such games are replaced by games of complete information involving chance. He emphasizes the consistent case, in which the various types of players in a game of incomplete information \(\Gamma\), as generated from the various beliefs, can be thought as being derived from a joint probability matrix. In this case Harsanyi constructs a game \(G\) of perfect recall and in extensive form, whose players represent the various types of the players in \(\Gamma\). They are called agents and \(G\) itself is called the agent-form game representing \(\Gamma\). The game \(G\) has the following properties: (i) Each agent, when he comes to play in \(G\), has the same beliefs as the type in \(\Gamma\) that he represents. (ii) Each agent, when he comes to play in \(G\), has the same choices as the type he represents has in \(\Gamma\). (iii) If the players agree in \(\Gamma\) to play a Nash equilibrium of \(G\), no type will find it beneficial to deviate, because deviating alone will not increase his payoff. It is sometimes erroneously believed that Harsanyi's theory will not work if the beliefs are inconsistent. The purpose of this paper is to dispel this belief. One example which indicates how this can be done already appeared in the book ``Repeated games with incomplete information from \textit{R. J. Aumann} and \textit{M. Maschler} [The MIT Press, Cambridge (1995)]. The present paper generalizes that example and supplies a formal proof. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0866.00071].
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- A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with incomplete information
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- The Bayesian formulation of incomplete information. The non-compact case
- Hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games: a generalization of the theoretical comparison of hypergames and Bayesian games considering hierarchy of perceptions
- Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
- Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games under ambiguity
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4064801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2067971 (Why is no real title available?)
- Games with Symmetric Incomplete Information and Asymmetric Computational Resources
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910817 (Why is no real title available?)
- The context of the game
- Games of incomplete information: a framework based on belief functions
- My encounters with John Harsanyi
- Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors
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