Games with zero-knowledge signaling

DOI10.1007/S11225-007-9067-4MaRDI QIDQ2464648zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Edward Epsen

Publication date 17 December 2007

Published in Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9067-4

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationRepeated gamesunobservable moveszero-knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network protocols (68M12) Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Complexity classes (hierarchies, relations among complexity classes, etc.) (68Q15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4189508
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592678
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4064801
• Nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs

Cites work

• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof Systems

Cited in

(3)

• Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information
• Games with incomplete information on the both sides and with public signal on the state of the game
• Honest signaling in zero-sum games is hard, and lying is even harder

This page was built for publication: Games with zero-knowledge signaling

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2464648)