Group-level imitation may stabilize cooperation

DOI10.1088/1742-5468/AE1A4DMaRDI QIDQ7293892zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Pierre Bousseyroux, Gilles Zerah, Michael Benzaquen

Publication date 10 July 2026

Published in Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-5468/AE1A4D

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical mechanics, structure of matter (82-XX)

Cites work

• Beitrag zur näherungsweisen Integration totaler Differentialgleichungen.
• Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game
• Evolutionary dynamics within and among competing groups
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Group-level events are catalysts in the evolution of cooperation
• Public goods games on random hyperbolic graphs with mixing
• Replicator dynamics of public goods games with global exclusion
• Rock-scissors-paper game on regular small-world networks
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• The evolution of cooperation
• The replicator dynamics for multilevel selection in evolutionary games
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas

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