How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?

DOI10.2307/2297581MaRDI QIDQ3806954zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 1988

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297581

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gameHamiltonianNash equilibriumoptimal government policiesprecommitmenttime-consistent policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic programming (90C39) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economic growth models (91B62)

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(31)

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• Optimal policy business cycles
• Time inconsistency in time-dependent team games
• Reputational and nonreputational policies under partial information
• Fiscal policy coordination and EMU. A dynamic game approach
• Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth
• Uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibrium in infinite-time affine-quadratic differential games
• Time-consistent policies
• On coincidence of feedback and global Stackelberg equilibria in a class of differential games
• Feedback Nash equilibria in optimal taxation problems
• Intertemporal monopolistic pricing of non-durables
• The issue of time inconsistency revisited as an extended game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4164515 (Why is no real title available?)
• INTERTEMPORAL INVESTMENTS INTO SYNFUELS
• Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
• The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of discounted and autonomous infinite horizon differential games
• Dynamic Inconsistency, Rational Expectations, and Optimal Government Policy
• Dynamic policy in linear models with rational expectations of future events: A computer package
• Analytical Policy Design under Rational Expectations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2099769 (Why is no real title available?)
• The political economy of indirect control
• Time consistency, subgame perfectness, solution concepts and information patterns in dynamic models of stabilization policies
• Examples in Dynamic Optimal Taxation
• Time-consistent control in nonlinear models
• Optimal target zones
• Fiscal policy coordination and EMU
• Large external debt and (slow) domestic growth
• Credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation
• Optimal introduction of time-of-day tariffs in the presence of consumer adjustment costs
• Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes
• Time consistent fiscal policies in a Ramsey economy

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